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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
RICHARD GALBREATH, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20060900-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
* * is 
INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT 
This is a consolidated appeal from two separate cases involving the same 
defendant and the same charges. 
In case 051800181, defendant was charged with having sold methamphetamine 
and marijuana to a police informant on July 8, 2005. Defendant was tried and convicted 
on June 13, 2006. On appeal, that case was originally designated as 20060992-CA, and 
defendant filed his opening brief on March 15, 2007. 
In case 051800180, defendant was charged with having sold methamphetamine 
and marijuana to a police informant on July 15, 2005. Defendant was tried and convicted 
on June 27, 2006. On appeal, that case was originally designated as 20060900-CA, and 
defendant filed his opening brief on April 23, 2007. 
On May 22, 2007, this Court issued an order consolidating the two appeals. The 
consolidated appeal is designated as 20060900-CA. This brief responds to the arguments 
set forth in both of defendant's original opening briefs. 
For purposes of clarity, the State will refer to case 051800181 as "Galbreath I" and 
case 051800180 as "Galbreath II." The State will cite to the record from Galbreath I as 
"R. I at " and the record from Galbreath II as "R. II at ." The State will cite to 
defendant's opening brief in Galbreath I as "Aplt. Br. I at " and defendant's opening 
brief in Galbreath II as "Aplt. Br. II at ." 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
In both cases, defendant was convicted of one count of distribution of or arranging 
to distribute a controlled substance (methamphetamine), a second degree felony, and one 
count of distribution of or arranging to distribute a controlled substance (marijuana), a 
third degree felony. This Court has jurisdiction over both appeals pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (West 2004). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL & STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Issue I (Galbreath I and II): In both cases, narcotics officers met with a 
confidential informant at a secured location and searched him to verify that he did not 
have access to any money or drugs. Officers then gave the confidential informant $120 
in pre-recorded bills and maintained audio and visual surveillance on him as he met with 
defendant. After meeting with defendant, the confidential informant returned with 
marijuana, methamphetamine, and $120 fewer dollars. 
Was this evidence sufficient to sustain defendant's convictions for distribution of 
or arranging to distribute a controlled substance? 
Standard of Review: On appeal from a jury verdict, this Court "review[s] the 
evidence and all inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the verdict." 
2 
State v. Greene, 2006 UT App 445, % 7, 147 P.3d 957 (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted). This Court "reverse[s] a jury verdict only when the evidence, so viewed, 
is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable such that reasonable minds must 
have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime for which he 
or she was convicted." Id. 
Issue II (Galbreath I and II): Did the trial courts commit plain error by failing to 
exclude testimony regarding defendant's drug history under Rule 404(b), where that 
testimony was necessary to provide context for the State's cases, and where there was 
also independent evidence establishing defendant's guilt? 
Standard of Review: To obtain relief under the plain error doctrine, defendant 
must show that "(i) an error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial 
court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood 
of a more favorable outcome" for the defendant. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 
(Utah 1993). 
When properly raised, a trial court's decision to admit evidence under Rule 404(b) 
is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Bradley, 2002 UT App 348, \ 12, 57 P.3d 
1139. 
Issue III (Galbreath I only): Did defendant receive ineffective assistance of 
counsel when his trial counsel acknowledged that defendant had prior involvement with 
drugs as part of a conscious trial strategy? 
Standard of Review: "An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for the 
first time on appeal presents a question of law." State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25,f 6, 89 P.3d 
3 
162. To demonstrate ineffectiveness, "defendant must show: (1) that counsel's 
performance was objectively deficient, and (2) a reasonable probability exists that but for 
the deficient conduct defendant would have obtained a more favorable outcome at trial." 
Id. (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). "Failure to satisfy either 
prong will result in our concluding that counsel's behavior was not ineffective." State v. 
Diaz, 2002 UT App 288, If 38, 55 P.3d 1131. 
Issue IV (Galbreath I and II): Did the trial court's failure to give a limiting jury 
instruction create a manifest injustice, where defendant never requested a limiting 
instruction below, and where defendant actually relied on the challenged evidence as part 
of his trial strategy? 
Standard of Review: A claim of manifest injustice is reviewed for plain error. 
State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, 10 n.5 (Utah App. 1996). 
Issue V (Galbreath II only): Did the trial court abuse its discretion by refusing 
to allow defendant to call a witness, where defendant had not notified the State about the 
proposed witness before trial, and where the proposed witness's testimony would have 
been insignificant. 
Standard of Review: A trial court's decision to exclude a proposed witness is 
overturned only "if the appellant demonstrates that the trial court has overreached the 
broad discretion granted it and thereby affected the appellant's substantial rights." 
Gerbich v. Numed, Inc., 1999 UT 37, f 16, 977 P.2d 1205. 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Utah Rules of Evidence Rule 404(b): 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the 
character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It 
may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity or absence of 
mistake or accident, provided that upon request by the accused, the 
prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in advance of 
trial, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause 
shown, of the nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASES 
Galbreath I: On November 7, 2005, defendant was charged with one count of 
distribution of or arranging to distribute a controlled substance (methamphetamine) and 
one count of distribution of or arranging to distribute a controlled substance (marijuana). 
R. I at 1-2. Defendant was convicted by a jury on June 13, 2006, and sentenced on 
September 11, 2006. R. I at 41-44, 87-90. Defendant timely appealed. R. I at 91. 
Galbreath II: On November 7, 2005, defendant was charged with one count of 
distribution of or arranging to distribute a controlled substance (methamphetamine) and 
one count of distribution of or arranging to distribute a controlled substance (marijuana). 
R. II at 1-2. Defendant was convicted by a jury on June 27, 2006, and sentenced on 
September 11, 2006. R. II at 59-64, 86. Defendant timely appealed. R. II at 89a-b. 
5 
STATEMENT OF FACTS1 
A narcotics informant agrees to target defendant 
in controlled, undercover drug buys 
In the late spring of 2005, Chad Affleck was arrested while he was selling drugs 
for defendant. R. I at 129: 120; R. II at 111. After Affleck was charged with four counts 
of felony drug distribution, R. II at 124: 125-26, officers from the Uintah Basin Narcotics 
Strike Force approached him and asked him whether he would help them build cases 
against local drug dealers by participating in a series of controlled drug buys. R. I at 129: 
17-18, 120-21; R. II at 124: 112. Affleck agreed, and the strike force accordingly 
dropped two of the four charges then pending against him. R. II at 124: 125-26. 
When an arrestee agrees to serve as a confidential informant, the strike force 
allows him to choose the target for the controlled drug buys. One of the officers later 
explained that the strike force doesn't "make up who they're going to go after, because 
we don't know who they know, as far as their circle of friends or the circle of dealers that 
they go through. So we let them tell us who they could get." R. II at 124: 148. 
Affleck had bought methamphetamine from defendant "several times." R. II at 
124: 124. He had also sold drugs for defendant, usually in exchange for drugs for his 
own personal use. R. I at 129: 120-21. According to Affleck, "a lot of drug addicts, the 
reason they distribute drugs . . . was because they are drug addicts. . . . And, you know, 
someone will say to him, 'Hey, go sell these drugs for me and I'll give you some free 
1
 The following facts are recited in the light most favorable to the jury verdicts. 
See State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, U2, 12 P.3d. 
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drugs to do.'" R. II at 124: 123-24. Unlike Affleck, defendant was not an addict, but 
instead sold the drugs purely for profit. R. I at 129: 120-21; R. II at 124: 124. Affleck 
resented this, complaining that defendant was "profiting off the misery of drug addicts." 
R. II at 124: 124. Affleck decided to target defendant with his controlled drug buys. R. I 
at 129: 120-21; R. II at 124: 123-24. 
Chad Affleck buys drugs from defendant on July 8, 2005 (Galbreath I) 
On July 8, 2005, Chad Affleck met with Officers Coil, Manning, and Adams from 
the strike force to set up a controlled drug buy from defendant. R. I at 129: 16-17, 120-
21. Upon arrival at a secured location, Officer Manning searched Affleck and 
determined that he did not have any drugs or money on him. R. I at 129: 70. While 
Officer Manning was conducting this search, Officer Coil searched Affleck's car and 
determined that there was no money or drugs in the car. R. I at 129: 94-96. 
With officers looking on, Affleck called defendant. R. I at 129: 71, 122. Affleck 
told defendant that "he was close to town and ready to meet" and that he wanted to 
purchase a gram of methamphetamine and an eighth of an ounce of marijuana. R. I at 
129: 71-72, 122. Defendant agreed to provide the drugs. R. I at 129: 122. 
The officers gave Affleck $140 in pre-recorded bills to use in the transaction. R. I 
at 129: 19. The officers also installed a wire transmitter in an oxygen bag that Affleck 
carried so that they could monitor his activities. R. I at 129: 129. 
Affleck drove his car to a nearby trailer park where defendant was staying. R. I at 
129: 72-74. Affleck did not make any stops on his way to the trailer park. R. I at 129: 
73, 122. When Affleck arrived, defendant got into Affleck's car and asked him to drive 
7 
to a nearby convenience store. R. I at 129: 123. As they were driving, Affleck handed 
defendant the $140 that the officers had given him. R. I at 129: 124. Defendant then 
handed Affleck an eighth of an ounce of marijuana and a gram of methamphetamine, 
which Affleck put into his shirt pocket. R. I at 129: 125. Affleck had previously told 
defendant that he was purchasing the drugs for a friend, so defendant gave Affleck one of 
the $20 bills back for having set up the transaction. R. I at 129: 124. After defendant and 
Affleck completed the transaction, they briefly stopped at the convenience store, and 
Affleck then drove defendant back to the trailer and dropped him off. R. I at 129: 24. 
The three narcotics officers followed Affleck in an unmarked vehicle and had 
maintained audio and visual surveillance throughout the encounter. R. I at 129: 72-73. 
The officers confirmed that Affleck did not meet or speak with anyone other than 
defendant during the drive. R. I at 129: 76, 125. The entire encounter last approximately 
14 minutes. R.I at 129: 28. 
After dropping defendant off at his trailer, Affleck drove straight to a secure 
location for a debriefing with the officers. R. I at 129: 24-25, 125. Upon arrival, the 
officers searched Affleck and his car again. R. I at 129: 24-25. They found a plastic bag 
with marijuana and methamphetamine in Affleck's front shirt pocket, as well as one of 
the $20 bills that they'd previously given him. R. I at 129: 25, 108-09. Thus, when 
Affleck had initially left, he had $140 and no drugs; when he returned, he had an eight of 
an ounce of marijuana, one gram of methamphetamine, and only $20 remaining. R. I at 
129:42-43. 
8 
Chad Affleck buys drugs from defendant on July 15, 2005 (Galbreath II) 
On July 15, 2005, Affleck called defendant and arranged to buy another gram of 
methamphetamine and another eighth of an ounce of marijuana. R. II at 124: 112-14. 
Later that evening, Affleck met with officers from the strike force at a secured location. 
R. II at 124: 38, 42-43. The procedure for this second drug buy largely mirrored that of 
the first. Affleck was first searched by Officer Adams to make sure that he did not have 
any money or drugs on him. R. II at 124: 43-46.2 In the meantime, Officer Manning 
installed a wire in Affleck's oxygen bag, R. II at 124: 46, and Officer Nelson searched 
Affleck's vehicle to make sure that there were no drugs or money there. R. II at 124: 91-
93.3 The officers then gave Affleck $120 in pre-recorded bills to use in the transaction. 
R. II at 124: 48. 
Officers followed Affleck in an unmarked vehicle while he drove to the Ute 
Petroleum Station in Myton, Utah. R. II at 124: 53, 95. The officers kept Affleck under 
visual and audio surveillance at all times. R. II at 124: 54. Affleck did not stop 
anywhere or talk with anybody else during this drive. R. II at 124: 54.4 As Affleck was 
2
 Officer Adams has searched "hundreds" of persons during his law enforcement 
career. R. II 124: 63-64. He has never subsequently learned that he had missed any 
contraband on a search like this one, and he was "one hundred percent" certain that 
Affleck did not have contraband on him on July 15, 2005. R. II at 124: 81, 88. 
3
 Officer Nelson has searched "close to a thousand" vehicles in his career. R. II at 
124: 100. He has never found out after the fact that he missed any contraband. R. II at 
124: 101. 
4
 Due to some problems with the audio surveillance equipment, the officers did 
have Affleck pull over for while they obtained working equipment. R. II at 124: 50-52. 
During this time, Officer Nelson waited with Affleck in Affleck's car. R. II at 124: 51-
52, 94. Affleck did not have contact with anybody else during this period. R. II at 124: 
94. 
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driving to the service station, the officers had him stop and call defendant. R. II at 124: 
138-39. Defendant answered the phone and confirmed that he would be meeting Affleck 
at the Ute Petroleum station in Myton. R. II at 124: 139. 
Upon arrival, Affleck parked in the service station parking lot and waited for 
defendant. R. II at 124: 54. The officers "blacked out" their vehicle and parked at a 
location that provided them with "a clear view" of the station parking lot. R. II at 124: 
54,96. 
Defendant arrived at the parking lot a short time after Affleck. R. II at 124: 56, 
97. Defendant got out of his vehicle, walked over to Affleck's car, and talked to Affleck 
through the driver's side window for a few minutes. R. II at 124: 56, 96-98, 108. While 
they were talking, defendant handed Affleck two bags—one containing a gram of 
methamphetamine, and one containing an eighth of an ounce of marijuana—and Affleck 
handed defendant the $120 that the officers had given him. R. II at 124: 57, 118-19. 
Defendant then left the scene without having entered Affleck's car or the store. R. II at 
124:57,76. 
Affleck did not meet or talk to anyone else during this entire encounter. R. II at 
124: 56, 75-76. After defendant left, officers followed Affleck to a secured location. R. 
II at 124: 57. The officers searched Affleck and his car again, discovered the 
methamphetamine and marijuana, and verified that the $120 they had given him was 
gone. R. II at 124: 59, 98. 
10 
Defendant's drug history discussed at his two trials 
As explained above, defendant was subsequently tried before two separate juries. 
In Galbreath I and II, Affleck testified that he had bought drugs from defendant in the 
past, and explained that this influenced his decision to target defendant with his 
controlled drug buys. R. I at 129: 119-21; R. II at 124: 123-25. 
Defendant testified in Galbreath I and openly discussed his own drug history. In 
his direct examination, for example, he admitted that he had been a drag addict in the past 
and that he was enrolled in drug court during July 2005. R. I at 129: 135-37, 141-42. 
Defendant also argued that though he had been involved with drugs in the past, he was 
now rehabilitated and that he had too much to lose to have sold drugs to Affleck. R. I at 
129: 149-50, 155, 175-76. Given these assertions, the State cross-examined him 
regarding his drug history, his enrollment in drug court, and regarding his actual 
motivations. R. I at 129: 143-47, 153. Defendant did not testify in Galbreath II. 
Defendant attempts to call Angela Medina in Galbreath II 
During Galbreath II, Officer Manning testified that he ran the license plates on 
defendant's car as a means of verifying defendant's identity. R. II at 124: 141. 
Following the conclusion of the State's case, defendant asked the Court for permission to 
call Angelina Medina as a witness. R. II at 124: 154. Defendant stated that Ms. Medina 
was his girlfriend and requested permission to call her "as a rebuttal witness on the 
testimony that Officer Manning gave regarding the ownership of the silver Taurus." R. 
II at 124: 154. 
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The trial court denied the motion for two reasons. First, the court held that 
defendant was on notice that the ownership of the car would be at issue, and excluded 
Ms. Medina because defendant had not identified her as a witness prior to trial. R. II at 
124: 155. Second, the court noted that although the defendant had invoked the 
exclusionary rule, Ms. Medina had been present throughout the trial. R. II at 124: 14, 
155. The court stated, however, that it would allow defendant to call "somebody from 
the Department of Motor Vehicles" to testify regarding the ownership of the vehicle. R. 
II at 124: 155. Defendant did not request a continuance to locate such a witness, nor did 
he call any other witness to testify regarding the car's ownership. R. II at 124: 155. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point I: In both Galbreath I and II, defendant argues that there was insufficient 
evidence to sustain his convictions. Affleck testified, however, that he bought drugs from 
defendant during the controlled drug buys using money that the narcotics strike force had 
provided him. This was corroborated by the officers who searched Affleck prior to the 
drug buys, who observed him throughout his encounters with defendant, and who then 
discovered marijuana and methamphetamine on him immediately after the encounters 
ended. This evidence is sufficient to sustain the juries' verdicts. 
Point II: In both Galbreath I and II, defendant argues that testimony regarding his 
drug history should have been excluded under Rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence. Defendant acknowledges that he did not object to this testimony at either trial. 
He nevertheless argues that this claim should be reviewed for the first time on appeal for 
plain error. With respect to Galbreath I, defendant cannot rely on plain error because he 
12 
actively relied on his drug history as part of his trial strategy. In any event, defendant has 
not shown obvious error with respect to either Galbreath I or II. Contrary to defendant's 
claims, the testimony regarding defendant's drug history was not offered for an improper 
purpose. Instead, the testimony was offered to provide context for the State's case, as 
well as to rebut defendant's assertions that he met with Affleck to discuss innocent 
matters. Defendant has also failed to show that he was prejudiced by the alleged errors. 
Point III: In Galbreath I, defendant argues that his 404(b) claim should also be 
reviewed for ineffective assistance of counsel. Defendant affirmatively relied on his drug 
history during the Galbreath I trial, however, and he acknowledges on appeal that this 
was part of a deliberately chosen trial strategy. Although that strategy was ultimately 
unsuccessful, it was reasonable, and this Court should accordingly reject defendant's 
ineffective assistance claim. 
Point IV: In both Galbreath I and II, defendant argues that he suffered manifest 
injustice when the trial courts failed to issue limiting instructions regarding his drug 
history. Defendant did not raise this claim below, however, and he has inadequately 
briefed the claim on appeal. In addition, insofar as defendant's drug history was properly 
at issue, the trial courts did not plainly err by failing to issue limiting instructions sua 
sponte. 
Point V: In Galbreath II, defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion 
by refusing to allow him to call a rebuttal witness. The trial court's decision was proper, 
however, because defendant failed to identify this witness in any pretrial pleading. In 
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addition, the proposed testimony would have been insignificant, and any error was 
therefore harmless. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO CONVICT 
DEFENDANT OF DRUG DEALING IN BOTH CASES, 
WHERE DEFENDANT SOLD DRUGS TO A 
CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT DURING CONTROLLED 
DRUG BUYS.5 
In both Galbreath I and Galbreath II, defendant claims there was insufficient 
evidence to convict him of the drug distribution charges. Aplt. Br. I at 18-20; Aplt. Br. II 
at 16-19. Defendant argues that Affleck did not have sufficient credibility as a witness 
and then asserts that he should not have been convicted "based on the informant's 
testimony alone." Aplt. Br. I at 20; Aplt. Br. II at 19. 
Defendant was convicted by a jury in both cases. When reviewing a sufficiency 
challenge to a jury verdict, the appellate court "determinefs] only whether sufficient 
competent evidence was admitted to satisfy each element of the charge [and] whether 
sufficient evidence was before the jury to enable it to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, 
that the defendant committed the crime." State v. Honie, 2002 UT 4, \ 44, 57 P.3d 977. 
Appellate courts "do not re-evaluate the credibility of witnesses or second-guess the 
jury's conclusion." Id. Instead, jury verdicts should be affirmed so long as "the evidence 
and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom" are not "so inconclusive and inherently 
improbable that the jury could not have found that each element of the crime had been 
5
 Defendant raises the sufficiency argument as point II in both briefs. For analytic 
reasons, the State addresses this issue first. 
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established beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
As a preliminary matter, defendant is incorrect in asserting that the he could not be 
convicted based on Affleck's testimony alone. In State v. Kasai, 495 P.2d 1265 (Utah 
1972), the Utah Supreme Court held that a conviction for distributing illegal drugs "may 
be founded on the purchaser's uncorroborated testimony." Id. at 1266. A number of 
Utah courts have since affirmed the general ability of a court to convict a defendant 
based solely on witness testimony in other contexts. See, e.g., State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 
1201, 1213 (Utah 1993) (holding that testimony of witnesses "is legally sufficient, 
standing alone, to support a conviction"); State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1261 (Utah 
1988) (noting that defendant's "commission of violent acts at the jail was proven by 
undisputed eyewitness testimony which we conclude was sufficient to prove his guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt"); State v. Stewart, 729 P.2d 610, 612 (Utah 1986) (holding 
that even "[w]ithout more, the eyewitness testimony of observing inmates [was] 
sufficient to support" a conviction). Thus, while Affleck's testimony was amply 
corroborated by physical and circumstantial evidence, it nevertheless could have 
properly sustained the conviction even without extrinsic support. His status as a 
confidential informant does not change this result. 
In any event, the jury verdicts in these cases were not "based on the informant's 
testimony alone." Aplt. Br. I at 20; Aplt. Br. II at 19. When Affleck picked up 
defendant on July 8, 2005 (Galbreath I), the officers had already searched Affleck and 
had confirmed that he had $140 and no drugs; when Affleck dropped defendant off 
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approximately 14 minutes later, Affleck only had $20 remaining, a gram of 
methamphetamine, and an eighth of an ounce of marijuana in his front shirt pocket. R. I 
at 129: 42-43. Before Affleck met with defendant on July 15, 2005 (Galbreath II), 
officers had again verified that he had $120 and no drugs; after Affleck finished talking 
with defendant in a service station parking lot, Affleck did not have any money, but he 
did have a gram of methamphetamine and an eighth of an ounce of marijuana in his front 
shirt pocket. R. II at 124: 59, 98. Officers maintained audio and visual surveillance on 
Affleck in both cases, and officers confirmed in both cases that Affleck did not have 
contact with anyone other than defendant during the relevant periods. R. I at 129: 76, 
125; R. II at 124: 56, 75-76. Thus, even without any testimony from Affleck, the 
officers' testimony alone would have supported the juries' conclusions that defendant 
gave Affleck drugs in exchange for $120 on both occasions. 
In response, defendant questions Affleck's credibility as a witness and again 
suggests that Affleck simply set him up. Aplt. Br. I at 18-21; Aplt. Br. II at 16-19. 
Defendant presented this argument at both trials below, R. I at 129: 170-76, R. II at 124: 
162, however, and the juries in both cases rejected this argument by convicting him of all 
charges. When reviewing a jury verdict, this Court must "assume that the jury believed 
the evidence that supports the verdict," and refuse to "'re-evaluate the credibility of 
witnesses or second-guess the jury's conclusion.'" State v. Fedorowicz, 2002 UT 67, f^ 
40, 52 P.3d 1194 (citation omitted). The juries in both cases believed Affleck, not 
defendant, and this Court may not second-guess those judgments on appeal. 
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Defendant also contends that because the officers did not actually hear a drug 
transaction occur in either case, the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. 
Aplt. Br. I at 18-20; Aplt. Br. II at 16-19. In Galbreath II, however, Affleck explained 
that such conversations are simply not common during illegal drug buys: 
A: And he come up and we just started in basic chit-chat and -
Q: Okay. 
A: —you know, so he took the drugs out of his left pocket and put them in my 
hand, took the money and -
Q: While you were chatting? 
A: Yeah. Chatting. We didn't say nothing. There wasn't nothing on the wire 
because we'd established everything, prices, amounts on the phone. 
Q: Now, is that common? 
A: If you meet in a public place, it's very common. 
Q: That you will make all the arrangements ahead of time? 
A: Yeah. 
Q: So if you had said, 'Wait a minute. Let me check that this is really a gram of 
meth,' would he have been suspicious? 
A: Well, no. The type—the thing is, when you meet in a public place like that, 
you kind of have to take your chances. 
Q: Right. But so if you had said, 'Wait, let me check,' or something— 
A: It would have drawn suspicion. 
Q: He would have wondered what you were doing. 
A: Yeah. We— 
Q: Or if you'd stood there and doled out the money, I guess? 
17 
A: Yeah. It would have drawn suspicion big time. 
R. II at 124: 119-20. 
Regardless, the State's cases were not dependent on the officers having actually 
heard the drug transactions. In both cases, the State showed that Affleck met with 
defendant while carrying a set of pre-recorded bills and no drugs, and that he then 
returned with marijuana, methamphetamine, and $120 fewer dollars. It "is the exclusive 
function of the jury to weigh the evidence and to determine the credibility of the 
witnesses." State v. Mead, 2001 UT 58, f 67, 27 P.3d 1115 (emphasis omitted). 
Although both juries were aware that officers had not heard a drug transaction occurring, 
the juries in both cases nevertheless weighed that deficiency against the other evidence 
and concluded that the transactions did in fact occur. This was the juries' prerogative, 
and this Court should accordingly reject defendant's sufficiency challenge. 
II. THE TRIAL COURTS DID NOT PLAINLY ERR BY 
ADMITTING TESTIMONY REGARDING DEFENDANT'S 
DRUG HISTORY 
During both trials, the State offered testimony regarding defendant's history as a 
drug user and dealer. In Galbreath I, this testimony was offered during Affleck's direct 
examination, as well as through questions that the State asked defendant on cross-
examination. R. I at 129: 119-21, 143-45, 152-55. In Galbreath II, this testimony was 
only offered during Affleck's direct examination. R. II at 124: 123-25.6 Defendant now 
6
 Defendant did not testify at trial during Galbreath II. 
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argues that the trial courts should have excluded this testimony sua sponte under Rule 
404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. Aplt. Br. I at 10-18; Aplt. Br. II at 10-16. 
To establish the existence of plain error, a party must show (1) that an error exists, 
(2) that the error should have been obvious to the trial court, and (3) that the error was 
harmful. Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208. If any one prong is unmet, the others need not be 
addressed and defendant's plain error claim necessarily fails. Id. at 1209. 
As a threshold matter, this Court should hold that defendant waived his right to 
plain error review in Galbreath I by actively relying on the challenged evidence at trial. 
In addition, this Court should reject the Rule 404(b) claims in both cases because the trial 
courts did not commit any error, let alone plain error, in admitting the challenged 
testimony. 
A. Defendant waived his plain error claim in Galbreath I by 
actively relying on his drug history during trial. 
As a threshold matter, this Court should hold that defendant has waived his right 
to plain error review of the 404(b) issue in Galbreath I. 
"[W]e do not appraise all rulings objected to for the first time on appeal under the 
plain error doctrine. For example, if trial counsel's actions amounted to an active, as 
opposed to a passive, waiver of an objection, we may decline to consider the claim of 
plain error." State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 158 (Utah 1989). "[I]f the failure to object 
before the trial court was the result of a consciously chosen trial strategy . . . the failure to 
object acts as a conscious waiver, and we are precluded from further review." State v. 
Morgan, 813 P.2d 1207, 1211 (Utah App. 1991); see also State v. Jimenez, 2007 UT 
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App 116,1fl[ 10-12, 158 P.3d 1128. Thus, a "'defendant cannot lead the court into error 
by failing to object and then later, when he is displeased with the verdict, profit by his 
actions."5 State v. Bloomfield, 2003 UT App 3, ^ 25, 63 P.3d 110 (quoting Bullock, 791 
P.2datl59). 
Defendant consciously embraced his drug history as part of his defense in 
Galbreath I. During his direct examination, defendant explained that in July 2005, he 
was "doing construction, N.A., drug court, and IOP." R. I at 129: 135-36.7 Defendant 
volunteered that he had "learned more about crystal meth than I ever want to" during the 
past year-and-a-half through "my IOP and drug court." R. I at 129: 137. Defendant also 
stated that he remembered taking the drive with Affleck on July 8, 2005, because he 
remembered talking about their mutual involvement in N.A. R. I at 129: 137, 141-42. 
Defendant also openly referred to himself as a drug "addict." R. I at 129: 143.8 
On cross-examination, the State asked defendant whether he had been convicted of 
a drug felony in Utah. R. I at 129: 143. Defendant admitted that he had, and then 
admitted that this was why he was in drug court. R. I at 129: 143-44, 147. On redirect, 
7
 The term "N.A." refers to Narcotics Anonymous, which is a support program that 
helps drug addicts to stay clean. R. II at 124: 122. Though not defined at either trial, the 
term "IOP" typically refers to an "intensive outpatient therapy" program for addicts. See, 
e.g., Sinkv. Knox County Hosps., 900 F.Supp 1065, 1068 (S.D. Ind. 1995); S.B.L. v. 
Cleburne County Dep 't of Human Res., 881 So.2d 1029, 1033 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003); 
Schaefer v. Egeland, 2004 MT 199, ^ 6, 95 P.3d 724. 
8
 Defendant further elaborated on his past history as a drug user on redirect. He 
stated that he'd "always had a problem with marijuana," but that he'd disliked "designer 
drugs" ever since he "did acid and 'shrooms" when he was in his teens. R. I at 129: 149. 
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defendant explained that he had been in drug court for "almost two years/' R. I at 129: 
148, and asked the jury to give his testimony more weight as a result: 
Q: Why should we believe you that you didn't give any drugs to Mr. 
Affleck? 
A: Only reason, I guess, is just I've been—I did drug court to change my 
life around for the better for my kids. And I thought I was doing good. I 
was doing excellent. . . . 
Q: Do charges like the one that we're here today o n -
A: Yeah. 
Q: —affect your drug court status? 
A: So far—well, they—I haven't been denied anything, but it's affected 
my mental state as far as being able to proceed into my drug court and 
doing what I need to do, basically. 
R. I at 129: 149-50. 
The State challenged defendant's drug court-based credibility argument on re-
cross. Defendant admitted that his prior felony drug charges were actually being held in 
abeyance because of his enrollment in drug court and that a conviction in the present case 
would result in a reinstatement of those charges: 
Q: On direct, you said that - she asked you if you had - there would be an 
effect if these charges or any other charges and convictions would have an 
effect on your drug court. Would it? 
A: Yeah, more than likely. 
Q: What would the effect be that you - what would you anticipate the 
effect to be? 
A: I don't know what the effect would be, truthfully. Maybe get kicked 
out of drug court. Don't know. 
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Q: If you got kicked out of drug court, what would happen to those 
charges? 
A: They would come into effect. 
Q: So they would be convictions? 
A: Uh-huh. (Affirmative.) 
R. I at 129: 153. 
Defendant tried to rehabilitate his drug court-based credibility argument on re-
direct by insisting that the drug court restrictions gave him an "incentive" to not deal 
drugs again. R. I at 129: 155. His trial counsel stressed this point during her closing 
argument: 
We did not testify that Mr. Galbreath was a saint. We testified that Mr. 
Galbreath has worked very hard for his sobriety and to overcome the 
problems that put him in drug court, and that he knew on July the 8th of last 
year that dealing drugs would put that all at jeopardy. And so he had 
motivation to not be involved with Mr. Affleck and to not do these things 
that Mr. Affleck has convinced the police officers that he did. 
R. I at 129: 175-76. 
In his brief, defendant admits that this was a strategic choice made by his trial 
counsel. Defendant states that "it may well have been the theory of defense that Mr. 
Galbreath was in drug court and was rehabilitated from the use of Marijuana and 
therefore not selling it." Aplt. Br. I at 15. Defendant also acknowledges that "the 
transcript sets forth that the defense strategy was to put Mr. Galbreath on the stand and 
have him testify about how he remembered that day, that he did talk to Affleck to give 
him help with Narcotics Anonymous and be a support to him but not sell him drugs." 
Aplt. Br. I at 15. 
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Rather than running from his past, defendant consciously chose to embrace it, 
apparently hoping to convince the jury that he was a changed man with too much to lose 
to have sold drugs. The jury was not convinced. "Circumstances like these are precisely 
why 'courts are not required to constantly survey or second-guess the nonobjecting 
party's best interests or trial strategy.'" State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 343 (Utah 1997) 
(citation omitted). "If trial counsel intentionally fails to object, the trial judge is put in the 
untenable position of deciding whether to intervene and potentially interfere with trial 
counsel's strategy or face review for plain error." Id. "The plain error rule exists," 
however, "to permit review of trial court rulings as a way of protecting a defendant from 
the harm that can be caused by less-than-perfect counsel. But the purpose of that rule is 
in no way implicated if defense counsel consciously elects to permit evidence to be 
admitted as part of a defense strategy rather than through inadvertence or neglect." 
Bullock, 791 P.2d at 159. To permit defendant to now "claim that the testimony in 
question should not have been admitted 'would permit him to present one strategy, lose, 
and then start over with a whole new strategy.'" Morgan, 813 P.2d at 1211 (citation 
omitted)). "Since [defendant] strategically chose not to object, [this Court should] 
decline to review for plain error" in Galbreath I. Brown, 948 P.2d at 343. 
B. The trial courts did not commit plain error in these cases 
by failing to strike the testimony regarding defendant's 
drug history. 
Defendant's Rule 404(b) argument, raised in both Galbreath I and II, should also 
be rejected on its merits. The Utah Supreme Court has established a three-step process 
for analyzing claims under Rule 404(b). First, the court must "determine whether the bad 
23 
acts evidence is being offered for a proper, noncharacter purpose." State v. Nelson-
Waggoner, 2000 UT 59, f 18, 6 P.3d 1120. Second, the "court must determine whether 
the bad acts evidence meets the requirements of rule 402, which permits admission of 
only relevant evidence." Id. at }^19. Third, the court must "determine whether the bad 
acts evidence meets the requirements of rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence." Id. at 
120. 
As set forth below, defendant's drug history (1) was offered for a proper, 
noncharacter purposes, (2) was relevant to those purposes, and (3) its probative value was 
not substantially outweighed by the threat of unfair prejudice. It therefore would not 
have been obvious to the trial court that the testimony should have been excluded, and 
defendant's plain error request should be denied. 
1, The testimony regarding defendant's drug history 
was offered for proper, noncharacter purposes. 
Defendant's principal contention is that the testimony regarding his drug history 
was offered for an improper purpose under Rule 404(b). Rule 404(b) states that while 
"[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a 
person in order to show action in conformity therewith," such evidence is admissible for 
"other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity or absence of mistake or accident." This list of acceptable 
noncharacter purposes is "not exhaustive . . . and evidence demonstrating other purposes 
is not precluded so long as the evidence is offered for a legitimate purpose other than to 
show the defendant's propensity to commit the crime charged." State v. Allen, 2005 UT 
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11, t 17, 108 P.3d 730. Thus, Rule 404(b) is an "inclusionary rule with regard to other 
crimes evidence which is offered for a proper, noncharacter purpose." State v. 
Decorso, 1999 UT 57, f 24, 993 P.2d 837. 
The testimony regarding defendant's drug history in these cases was not offered 
for an improper purpose, but rather for the legitimate noncharacter purpose of providing 
factual context for the State's case. This Court has held that the "prosecutor is entitled to 
paint a factual picture of the context in which the events in question transpired" and can 
present evidence of prior bad acts "as background information" if needed to explain 
"how the charges against [the defendant] came forward." Morgan, 813 P.2d at 1210 n.4. 
Thus, a defendant's prior bad acts can be discussed "to show the general circumstances 
surrounding" the crime at issue. State v. Pierce, 722 P.2d 780, 782 (Utah 1986); see also 
State v. Boyd, 2001 UT 30, f^ 24, 25 P.3d 985 (allowing presentation of prior bad acts as 
"background" for the State's case-in-chief); State v. Daniels, 584 P.2d 880, 882 (Utah 
1978) (allowing the State to present evidence regarding the "circumstances" surrounding 
a crime); State v. Dominguez, 2003 UT App 158, ^  21, 72 P.2d 127 (allowing 
presentation of prior criminal history when presented as "context for admissible 
evidence"). 
While no Utah court has addressed this rule in the specific context of past drug 
dealing, a number of other courts have allowed witnesses to testify that a defendant had 
previously dealt drugs when that testimony was necessary to provide background for the 
prosecution's case. In United States v. McLean, 138 F.3d 1398 (11th Cir. 1998), for 
example, the Eleventh Circuit allowed testimony regarding the defendant's past drug 
25 
dealing to "explain[ ] why [defendant] was the target of the government's investigation." 
Id. at 1404. The court also noted that the testimony was permissible to "explain[ ] the 
relationship between [defendant] and the confidential informant" and to "establish[ ] the 
credibility" of the informant's overall story. Id. 
In United States v. Chavis, 429 F.3d 662 (7th Cir. 2005), the Seventh Circuit 
similarly allowed testimony that the defendant had been a drug dealer where it 
"completed the story for the jury, explaining how [defendant] and [the confidential 
informant] knew each other, worked together, and eventually ended up together in the 
liquor store parking lot on November 22." Id. at 670-71. The court noted that "[t]he 
absence of this evidence about the prior dealings between Jefferson and Chavis would 
leave major questions regarding the conspiracy," and therefore held that Rule 404(b) was 
not violated. Id. This same rule has been applied in a number of other cases. See, e.g., 
United States v. Stephens, 365 F.3d 967, 972-75 (11th Cir. 2004) (allowing testimony 
that a confidential informant had been a drug dealer to show that he could have obtained 
the drugs from some other source, rather than from defendant); United States v. Miranda, 
248 F.3d 434, 440-41 (5th Cir. 2001) (allowing testimony that defendant was a drug 
dealer to establish the connection between the defendant and the drug buyer); United 
States v. Rush, 240 F.3d 729, 731 (8th Cir. 2001) (allowing testimony of defendant's past 
drug dealings to refute defendant's "defenses of lack of knowledge of contraband, lack 
of specific intent, and a general denial"); United States v. Molina, 111 F.3d 1048, 1054-
55 (8th Cir. 1999) (allowing testimony of a defendant's past drug dealings to refute claim 
that she was "merely an innocent bystander" to the drug transaction at issue); United 
26 
States v. Zolicoffer, 869 F.2d 771, 773 (3d Cir. 1989) (allowing testimony that defendant 
was a drug dealer to show that "defendant had access to drugs" and that he "was willing 
and hoping to engage in large scale drug transactions"). 
Although defendant claimed that his encounters with Affleck were random and 
innocent, R. I at 129: 137-42; R. II at 124: 164-66, the testimony of Affleck and the 
narcotics officers showed that there was nothing random or innocent about these 
encounters. As discussed above, Affleck was searched, wired, and monitored throughout 
these two encounters, and the State was accordingly entitled to explain why these 
elaborate steps had been taken. To do this, the State had to explain why Affleck was 
cooperating with the narcotics task force in the first place, and why Affleck had targeted 
defendant for his controlled drug buys. Both of these explanations were tied to the fact 
that defendant had previously sold drugs to Affleck. 
Defendant nevertheless suggests that Affleck could have "testified that he called 
Galbreath that day to see if he could buy drugs" without mentioning that he had 
previously bought drugs from Galbreath. Aplt. Br. I at 10-18; Aplt. Br. II at 12. It is 
difficult to see how the State could have done this while still presenting a coherent case 
to the juries. Affleck did not pick defendant's name at random out of the phone book, 
nor did he contact a broad list of friends and acquaintances asking if anybody had illegal 
drugs to sell. Rather, Affleck called defendant, and defendant only, precisely because 
Affleck had previously bought drugs from defendant. Without this explanation, the jury 
would have been left with "major questions" regarding how it was that defendant and 
Affleck "knew each other, worked together, and eventually ended up together" on July 8 
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and 15, 2005. Chavis, 429 F.3d at 670-71. The State was not required to present its case 
in piecemeal fashion, but was instead entitled to present its story as part of a coherent 
whole. Defendant's drug history was an integral part of that story. 
In addition to providing context for the State's case, the discussion of defendant's 
drug history was also appropriate to rebut defendant's assertion that the State's claims 
were fabricated. Specifically, when defendant testified in Galbreath I, he claimed that he 
had only talked about N.A. business with Affleck during their July 8 drive. R. I at 129: 
137, 142. Although defendant did not testify in Galbreath II, his counsel repeatedly 
suggested during the trial that defendant and Affleck had not discussed anything criminal 
during their encounter in the convenience store parking lot. R. II at 124: 76-77; 105-06; 
165-66. Defendant then argued in both cases that Affleck had fabricated the charges 
against him. See, e.g., R. I at 129: 14, 171-73; R. II at 124: 162-67. 
In State v. Bradley, 2002 UT App 348, 57 P.3d 1139, this Court held that the State 
could introduce testimony of prior bad acts as a means of preemptively rebutting the 
defendant's claims of fabrication. Id. at lfl{ 73-78. In that case, the testimony was 
deemed admissible because it showed a "pattern of behavior" that was consistent with 
the claims at issue, thereby rebutting the defendant's fabrication defense. Id. As in 
Bradley, the challenged testimony here demonstrated a pattern of behavior consistent 
with the State's charges. While defendant claimed that he had merely stopped to talk to 
Affleck about mundane matters, Affleck's testimony demonstrated that these 
conversations fit within the pattern of their ongoing drug-dealing relationship. 
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Defendant ultimately asserts that these trials hinged on the comparative credibility 
of Affleck and himself. See, e.g., R. I at 129: 170-76; R. II at 124: 11-12, 161-67. Given 
this, the question of whether defendant had previously dealt drugs to Affleck had a direct 
bearing on the question of who was telling the truth about the July 8 and July 15 
encounters. Defendant's drug history was not only necessary to provide context, but also 
to rebut defendant's claim that he and Affleck had simply met to engage in isolated, 
innocent banter. These were both proper purposes under Rule 404(b). 
2. The testimony regarding defendant's drug history was 
relevant to this case. 
Rule 402 is ordinarily examined as the second part of the three-pronged Rule 
404(b) analysis. Nelson-Waggonner, 2000 UT 59 at [^18. Though defendant did make 
one single, passing reference to Rule 402 in each of his briefs, Aplt. Br. I at 17; Aplt. Br. 
II at 12, defendant did not make any other reference to the rule, nor did he mention it in 
the Table of Contents, the Table of Authorities, the Summary of the Argument, any 
heading or sub-heading, or the Conclusion of either brief. As such, the Rule 402 aspect 
of the Rule 404(b) analysis has not been properly raised and is not before this Court. Cf 
State v. Johnson, 2007 UT App 184, f 28, 579 Utah Adv. Rep. 5 (analyzing only the first 
and third prongs of the 404(b) analysis where those were the only prongs addressed by 
the defendant on appeal). 
To the extent that defendant has made a Rule 402 argument, this argument is 
inadequately briefed. Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires a 
party to support any argument "with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the 
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record relied on." "Our rules require not just bald citation to authority but development 
of that authority and reasoned analysis based on that authority." Anderson v. Taylor, 
2006 UT 79, TJ 25, 149 P.3d 352 (internal quotation and citations omitted). Defendant has 
not analyzed any case that interprets Rule 402, nor has defendant offered any Rule 402-
specific analysis. See generally Aplt. Br. I at 10-18; Aplt. Br. II at 10-16. As such, this 
Court should assume that the second prong of the Rule 404(b) analysis is met. 
Regardless, the testimony regarding defendant's drug dealing history was relevant 
under Rule 402. Rule 402 states that evidence must be relevant to be admissible. 
Evidence is relevant if it has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of 
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it 
would be without the evidence." Utah R. Evid. 401. "Under the minimal threshold of 
Rule 401, relevancy objections should be seldom sustained if counsel offering the 
evidence can explain the rational connection between the evidence offered and the issues 
of consequence in the case." R. Collin Mangrum & Hon. Dee Benson, Mangrum & 
Benson on Utah Evidence 108 (2005). "If evidence would make a disputed fact of 
consequence more probable in any degree, then the evidence satisfies the level of 
probative value required by Rule 401." Id. at 109. 
As discussed above, the challenged testimony showed that defendant and Affleck 
had an ongoing drug dealing relationship. This existence of this relationship made it 
more likely than not that Affleck called and met with defendant to buy drugs, rather than 
to discuss mundane matters as defendant has subsequently claimed. Defendant's drug 
history was therefore relevant under Rule 402. 
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3. The testimony regarding defendant's drug history 
was not unfairly prejudicial. 
Finally, the testimony regarding defendant's past was not unfairly prejudicial 
under Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. Rule 403 states that "[ajlthough relevant, 
evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger 
of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations 
of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." "A 
Rule 403 analysis involves a balancing of probative value against the non-probative 
factors listed in Rule 403. The court's balancing under Rule 403 is a matter left largely to 
the sound discretion of the trial court, and its ruling will be upheld absent an abuse of 
discretion." Mangrum & Benson on Utah Evidence at 121. 
As with Rule 402, defendant only makes a single reference to Rule 403 in each of 
his briefs, Aplt. Br. I at 17; Aplt. Br. II at 12, and does not mention Rule 403 in the Table 
of Contents, the Table of Authorities, the Summary of the Argument, any heading or sub-
heading, or the Conclusion of either brief. Defendant has also failed to analyze any case 
that specifically interpreted Rule 403. See generally Aplt. Br. I at 10-18; Aplt. Br. II at 
10-16. This Court should accordingly decline to address the Rule 403 implications of 
defendant's argument. 
To the extent that defendant has raised a Rule 403 argument, that argument should 
still be rejected. As noted above, Rule 403 calls for the exclusion of evidence where the 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. In State v. 
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Maurer, 770 P.2d 981 (Utah 1989), the Utah Supreme Court noted that "all effective 
evidence is prejudicial in the sense of being damaging to the party against whom it is 
offered." Id. at 984. Given this, "prejudice which calls for exclusion is given a more 
specialized meaning: an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, 
commonly but not necessarily an emotional one, such as bias, sympathy, hatred, 
contempt, retribution, or horror." Id. at 984 (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted). Evidence is therefore deemed to be directed at an "improper basis" when it has 
an undue tendency to "cause the jury to base its decision on something other than the 
established propositions of the case." State v. Lindgren, 910 P.2d 1268, 1272 (Utah 
App. 1996) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
As explained above, the challenged testimony in these cases was not directed 
toward an improper, emotional basis, but was instead offered to provide context for the 
drug transactions in question, as well as to rebut defendant's claims of fabrication. This 
testimony therefore had legitimate, probative value that was clearly directed toward "the 
established propositions of [this] case." Lindgren, 910 P.2d at 1272. To the extent that 
defendant was prejudiced by this testimony, this prejudice was only the result of the 
testimony's probative value, and this type of prejudice is expressly permitted under Rule 
403. Maurer, 770 P.2d at 984. Rule 403 was therefore not violated in either case. 
C. Even if the court erred in admitting the testimony 
regarding defendant's drug history, any error was 
harmless. 
Even if this Court determines that the testimony regarding defendant's drug 
history should have been excluded, this Court should still reject defendant's plain error 
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claim because the error was harmless. Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208. In State v. Honie, 2002 
UT 4, 57 P.3d 977, this Court held that "[a]n error is harmful if it is such that absent the 
error, there is a sufficiently high likelihood of a different outcome, undermining our 
confidence in the result." Id. at \ 54. "[T]he burden of showing a sufficiently high 
likelihood of a different outcome rests on the complaining party." Id. 
Though the testimony regarding Defendant's drug history was important to the 
State's cases, its importance rested in its ability to provide context and coherency. 
Contrary to defendant's claims, however, the State's cases were never based upon 
defendant's drug history. Instead, the State's cases were based on Affleck's testimony 
regarding the transactions, the testimony of the officers who monitored the transactions, 
and the methamphetamine and marijuana which Affleck obtained from defendant, none 
of which defendant has challenged as being inadmissible on appeal. Aplt. Br. I at 10-21; 
Aplt. Br. Hat 10-19. 
In her closing statement Galbreath I, the prosecutor therefore summed up her case 
by reminding the jury that "[y]ou've heard testimony today. The officers' testimony and 
the informant's was accurate and unequivocal. Based on this, you must convict the 
defendant." R. I at 129: 169-70 (emphasis added). In her rebuttal, she again stressed this 
basic theme: "There were no drugs to begin with; there was money. But when the 
informant came back, there was no money, except for the twenty, and there were drugs. 
So common sense tells you that the defendant... the defendant was the only person that 
came and entered that. . . one small confined area. So he was the one that had to . . . 
have the drugs and that had to bring them to the informant." R. I at 129: 180. 
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In Galbreath II, the prosecutor opened her closing statement by summarizing the 
State's case in a similar manner: "Folks, someone sold drugs. The defendant sold both 
methamphetamine and marijuana to an undercover agent. He was paid with money that 
the police had given to the undercover agent. And, in return, the informant was able to 
bring back to the police both marijuana and methamphetamine." R. II at 124: 157. The 
prosecutor then described the case as being "simple and . . . easy. The informant was 
given $120 by the police. They monitored him from that moment on, whether they were 
sitting with him or whether they were trailing behind him and listening to him." R. II at 
124: 157. In her rebuttal, she returned to this same theme: "I think the reality is that car 
was observed, there was only one person go to it, and . . . after that person approached the 
car, there were drugs in the car and the money was gone. So I would ask you to please 
convict him on the basis that there is no one else that could have done this, no one else 
that could have sold these drugs to Mr. Affleck." R. II at 124: 170-71. 
Defendant's appellate challenges are directed at the contextual pieces of the 
State's case, not at its case-in-chief. Even if this Court concludes that defendant's drug 
history should have been excluded, this Court should nevertheless hold that there is not a 
sufficient likelihood that the results below would have been any different. Defendant's 
404(b) argument should be rejected. 
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III. DEFENDANT'S TRIAL COUNSEL DID NOT RENDER 
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN 
GALBREATHI 
In Galbreath I, defendant also claims that his counsel was ineffective for not 
objecting to the testimony regarding his drug history at trial. Aplt. Br. I at 12-16.9 This 
claim should be rejected for two reasons. 
First, Galbreath5 s trial counsel was not ineffective. "In claiming ineffectiveness of 
counsel, defendant must bear the burden of demonstrating that trial counsel's 
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment and 
that counsel's performance was prejudicial." Bullock, 791 P.2d at 159. Defendant must 
also "overcome the strong presumption that trial counsel rendered adequate assistance 
and exercised reasonable professional judgment." Id. at 159-60. "In evaluating defense 
counsel's strategy under an ineffective-assistance analysis, we give trial counsel wide 
latitude in making tactical decisions and will not question such decisions unless there is 
no reasonable basis supporting them." Bloomfield, 2003 UT App 3, |30 (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted). Given the "strong presumption of competence, 
[this Court] need not come to a conclusion that counsel, in fact, had a specific strategy in 
mind." State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461, 468 (Utah App. 1993). "Instead, [this Court] 
only needs to be able to "articulate some plausible strategic explanation for counsel's 
behavior." Id. Thus, "[i]f a rational basis for counsel's performance can be articulated, 
we will assume counsel acted competently. Indeed, authority from this court supports the 
notion that an ineffective assistance claim succeeds only when no conceivable legitimate 
9
 Defendant does not claim ineffective assistance in Galbreath II. 
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tactic or strategy can be surmised from counsel's actions." Id.; see also State v. Holbert, 
2002 UT App 426, t 58, 61 P.3d 291 (if the "'conceivable tactical bases for defense 
counsel's actions are apparent,' [djefendant has not overcome the 'strong presumption 
that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance, 
and we must assume defense counsel acted competently'"(citation and internal 
alterations omitted)). 
As discussed above, defendant expressly incorporated his drug history into his trial 
strategy during Galbreath I. Given the strength of the evidence against him, his trial 
counsel reasonably believed that defendant's best strategy was to embrace his past and 
argue that he was a changed man with too much to lose to have sold drugs to Affleck on 
these occasions. While this trial strategy failed, it is at the very least apparent from the 
record and thus subject to the strong presumption of competency. Defendant has not 
demonstrated that there was no conceivable tactical basis for this approach, and his 
ineffective assistance claim should accordingly be rejected. 
Second, "'a common standard is applicable'" when a defendant's claims of plain 
error and ineffective assistance of counsel are based on the same alleged error. Ellifritz, 
835 P.2d at 174 (citation omitted). In such cases, "[f]ailure to meet the plain error 
requirement of prejudice means that defendant likewise fails to meet the required 
showing under the ineffective assistance of counsel standard." Id. (citation omitted). As 
discussed above, defendant has not shown that the outcome below would have been any 
different without the presentation of the challenged evidence. Defendant's ineffective 
assistance claim should therefore be rejected on this basis as well. 
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IV. DEFENDANT'S MANIFEST INJUSTICE CLAIM SHOULD 
BE REJECTED BECAUSE DEFENDANT FAILED TO 
PROPOSE ANY LIMITING INSTRUCTION BELOW AND 
BECAUSE DEFENDANT RELIED ON THE VERY 
EVIDENCE THAT HE NOW CHALLENGES 
Defendant also claims that the trial courts plainly erred by failing to give limiting 
instructions regarding his drug history. Aplt. Br. I at 14; Aplt. Br. II at 13-16. In 
Gaibreath I, defendant specifically claims that this failure constituted a manifest 
injustice. Aplt. Br. at 14. There are three problems with this argument. 
First, the argument is inadequately briefed. In Gaibreath I, defendant has cited 
cases that applied the manifest injustice doctrine to jury instructions that were 
improperly given. Aplt. Br. I at 14. He has not cited any case, however, in which the 
doctrine was applied to a hypothetical jury instruction that was never requested. In 
Gaibreath II, defendant has not cited any cases discussing limiting instructions at all, nor 
has he cited to any governing standard. Aplt. Br. II at 13-16. 
Additionally, although defendant complains in general terms of the court's failure 
to give a limiting instruction, he has not included a copy of proposed instructions, nor 
has he identified with any precision what he thinks the instructions should have said. 
This Court is not "'simply a depository in which the appealing party may dump the 
burden of argument and research.9" State v. Barrett, 2006 UT App 417, f 16 n.7, 147 
P.3d 491. Defendant's claim that the courts should have issued limiting instructions is 
inadequately briefed and should be rejected on that basis alone. 
Second, while a court '"may review an error in [a] jury instruction[ ], even if such 
instruction was not objected to at trial, to avoid manifest injustice," manifest injustice "is 
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determined using the plain error standard."5 Irwin, 924 P.2d at 10 n. 5 (alterations in 
original) (citation omitted). As noted above, the courts did not commit any error, let 
alone plain error, in admitting the challenged testimony. There was accordingly no need 
to give limiting instructions, and defendant has not suffered a manifest injustice. 
Third, review for manifest injustice is inappropriate "if counsel, either by 
statement or act, affirmatively represented to the court that he or she had no objection to 
the jury instruction." State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, f 54, 70 P.3d 111. "This prevents a 
party from taking advantage of an error committed at trial when that party led the trial 
court into committing the error." Id. As discussed above, defendant's trial strategy in 
Galbreath I was largely built around the evidence he now challenges. In fact, defendant 
offered much of the testimony he now complains of during his own direct examination. 
Thus, defendant is essentially asking this Court to conclude that he suffered a manifest 
injustice when the trial court failed to instruct the jury to ignore him. If accepted, this 
argument would allow parties to create their own manifest injustice by improperly 
testifying at trial and then arguing on appeal that their own testimony prejudiced their 
own case. This Court should decline to adopt such an expansive view of this otherwise 
limited doctrine. 
V. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
EXCLUDING DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED REBUTTAL 
WITNESS 
Finally, defendant argues that the trial court in Galbreath II abused its discretion 
by denying his request to call Angela Medina as a witness. Aplt. Br. II at 10-11. 
Defendant argues that Officer Manning's July 15th identification of defendant was based 
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on having run the license plates, and that if he could have disproven the claim that those 
plates were registered to him, the State would have had "no credible, reliable evidence 
that [defendant] was the person who drove to Ute Petroleum to meet Chad Affleck on the 
night of July 15, 2005." Aplt. Br. II at 11. Defendant's claim should be rejected for 
three reasons. 
First, this argument is inadequately briefed. Defendant has not cited to any rule, 
case, or other legal authority discussing the power of a trial court to exclude a proposed 
witness, let alone applied such authority to the challenge here. "As we have noted many 
times before, 'this court is not a depository in which the appealing party may dump the 
burden of argument and research.5" State v. Green, 2004 UT 76, ^ 13, 99 P.3d 820 
(citation omitted). This Court should accordingly decline to address this claim. 
Second, courts should only "overturn a trial court ruling excluding a proffered 
witness if the appellant demonstrates that the trial court has overreached the broad 
discretion granted it and thereby affected the appellant's substantial rights." Gerbich v. 
Numed, Inc., 1999 UT 37, ^ 16, 977 P.2d 1205. "In determining whether a trial court has 
abused its discretion in excluding a witness's testimony where the witness was not 
disclosed beforehand, the court ask[s] whether the testimony of the excluded witness 
could have been reasonably anticipated by the objecting party prior to trial or whether 
the testimony constituted unfair surprise." Id. To prevail on a claim like this one, an 
appellant accordingly "has the burden of showing that the trial court erred in determining 
that" the identification issue could have been anticipated. Turner v. Nelson, 872 P.2d 
1021, 1024 (Utah 1994). 
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Defendant was provided with the police reports before trial, and those reports 
specifically mentioned the silver Taurus. R. II at 124: 155. At trial, Officer Manning 
testified that he had written down the results of his license plate search in his notes, R. II 
at 124: 142, which defendant also had access to before trial. R. II at 124: 155. Given 
this, defendant could have reasonably anticipated that Officer Manning would refer to his 
license plate search during his testimony. Defendant was therefore on notice of this 
testimony and could have designated any witnesses before trial. Because he did not do 
so, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow him to call a non-
designated witness mid-trial. 
Third, any error regarding this decision was harmless because Officer Manning 
also identified defendant through other means. Officer Manning stated that he had "had 
prior dealings with Mr. Galbreath" and that he had both seen and spoken with him 
before. R. II at 124: 136. Officer Manning also testified that defendant has a "very deep 
voice that's very distinctive," and stated that he could identify his voice on the 
recordings. R. II at 124: 136. As Affleck was driving to the Ute Petroleum station, the 
officers had him stop and call defendant. R. II at 124: 138-39. Officer Manning listened 
to this call and heard defendant tell Affleck that he was waiting for him "at the store in 
Myton." R. II at 124: 139, 142-43. After they arrived at the service station in Myton, 
Officer Manning saw the transaction and visually confirmed that defendant approached 
Affleck and spoke with him through the car window. R. II at 124: 141. Officer Manning 
also listened to the conversation through the police wire and recognized defendant's 
voice. R. II at 124: 144. Thus, contrary to defendant's claim, Officer Manning's 
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identification of him was not based on the license plates, but rather on the fact that 
Officer Manning saw him and heard his voice during the transaction. Given this, any 
error was harmless. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm defendant's convictions. 
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